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SINCE ITS EARLY DAYS, the Greek state has found in 
archaeology its ideological foundations and the implements 
of its international strategies. The development of a 
national – Helladic, as opposed to ‘Greek’ or ‘Classical’ 
– archaeology offered to the newly established kingdom a 
welcome repertoire of symbols and devices.
Archaeology, and its ever so eager practitioners, worked 
for the promotion of a crucial ideological premise, that of 
the historical and cultural continuity of the Hellenic na-
tion, from the glory that was prehistoric Greece to the fu-
ture triumphs of Hellenism (albeit via the misfortunes and 
tribulations of the present).1 In 1852, Kyriakos Pittakis, a 
veteran of the War of Independence and a self-taught ar-
chaeologist, published his first in a series of papers entitled 
‘Materials to be used to prove that the current inhabitants 
of Greece are descendants of the ancient Greeks’.2 This 
cumbersome but remarkably eloquent title does not try to 
hide the simple tactics of the project: page after page, Pit-
takis’ papers list popular practices and sayings of his time 
which he associates, at face value, with seemingly similar 
ones he had found recorded in ancient literary sources. The 
author does not discuss, nor does he offer additional argu-
mentation; the mere juxtaposition is presumably expected 
to speak for itself, driving home an otherwise self-evident 
point. This noble effort to substantiate ‘scientific’ claims 
regarding Greece’s Hellenic past demonstrates, to para-
phrase Arjun Appadurai,3 the ‘notably synaesthetic and 
largely pretheoretical’ strategies of a determined Greek 
scholar faced with the political and ideological challenges 
of modernity.
The launch, by Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, of a 
tripartite scheme for Greek history (antiquity – Byzan-
tium – modern Hellenism)4 and the contemporaneous 
‘discovery’ of Greek prehistory by archaeologists such as 
Christos Tsountas5 in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, determined the agenda of Greek archaeology for 
the twentieth century: to unearth the ‘missing links’ in 
the evolutionary chain of Hellenism and investigate a 
historical development, the individual stages of which led 
inevitably to the present, plausibly also anticipating the 
future of this new (though ever so old!) nation.
Following the early attempts by pioneering enthusi-
asts such as Pittakis, Greek archaeology benefited from 
academic developments abroad, when the positivist para-
digm, perfected in Western Europe – mostly Germany –, 
was imported by Greek archaeologists who had studied 
under the great European archaeologists of the time. The 
new paradigm had been specifically designed to facilitate 
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‘Take the essence of the metaphor to be comparison and the 
essence of the story to be time. […] The engineer and historian 
do not deal in mere comparison or mere time, no more than 
poets or novelists do. Aimless comparison is bad poetry and bad 
engineering; one damned thing after another is bad fiction and 
bad history. The point is pointedness, which will vary with the 
purpose in mind. (The point, incidentally, need not be simple 
or realistic or of any other kind especially approved by the 
nineteenth century)’.
D.N. Mccloskey, History, differential equations, and the 
problem of narration, HistoryandTheory 30 (1991) 21.
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the study of grand continuities and the composition of the 
appropriate interpretative narratives. The main beneficia-
ry proved to be Greek – Hellenic– art, in its many facets: 
prehistoric as well as classical, Byzantine and ‘post-Byzan-
tine’ Greek art was explored and largely exploited through 
a simple, and at times quite simplistic, linear art historical 
narrative, which haunts Greek university curricula to the 
present day6 (and is certainly not absent from many an 
‘established’ university department worldwide).
As will be argued in the last part of this paper, our rea-
sons for maintaining a linear perception of (art-)historical 
time are fundamentally political, and ought to be attrib-
uted to the peculiarities of modern Greek ideology rather 
than the academic needs of our chosen discipline.
Paragons and principles
Classical archaeology as an academic discipline in the twen-
tieth century reaped the benefits of the philosophical herit-
age of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. As a result, 
it was seen as a branch of Classics rather, and far less than, 
if at all, as a clear-cut archaeological science. The emphasis 
on the research of classical culture – history, literature, and 
the arts of Greece and Rome – is intensely reminiscent of 
the Renaissance, when the study of cultural remains from 
the classical past was thought to document the picture 
emerging from the ancient texts, themselves recognized as 
authentic sources of information regarding the past. 
On the other hand, classical archaeology emerged as a 
fully-fledged discipline at a time of rapture with the past, 
when a new way of thinking, a new ethos, was emerging, 
that of modernity (which was the point of construction 
of all so-called ‘Human sciences’).7 This kind of modern 
thinking, largely based on historicism and a positivist ap-
proach to humanism – in many ways departing from the 
heritage of the Enlightenment – still dominates classical 
archaeology. Its practitioners today seem more or less sat-
isfied with their discipline’s vaguely humanist pedigree, 
but also very much reluctant to proceed to a rethinking of 
its academic reasoning and methods, in order to produce 
a kind of ‘theory’ for classical archaeology. As a result, 
most of us remain confined within the limits of an aca-
demic tradition which we promote, recycle, or sub-con-
sciously tamper with, surrendering to empirical reasoning 
and other, largely non-academic, influences.8
Although not modernity’s sole agent,9 it has to be admit-
ted that the Enlightenment project provided cultural his-
tory with both its fundamental ideology and the premise 
for its methodology. The ‘noble, optimistic, rational doc-
trine and ideal’  of the Enlightenment,10 was constructed 
upon a series of strong and axiomatic convictions about 
humanity and human civilization, a repertoire of beliefs 
today established as the natural basis of any historical or 
cultural inquiry. In short, these implicit principles are: 
the world – the universe, nature, man and man-made 
culture – is governed as a single entity by a single set of 
laws, natural, systematic, and rational; that humans – of 
any race, time, or place – are capable of improvement, 
progress, emancipation, and (ultimately) happiness; and 
that – as a result – it is possible to establish an ideal society, 
merely through rational thinking, understanding of and 
compliance with the natural laws which both the cosmos 
and man are subject to.11 It is, therefore, man’s prime duty 
to decode, study, test, and apply those natural laws so that 
he can become the creator of his own happiness.
The influence of enlightened logic in the disciplines 
of history and archaeology is rather obvious, and can be 
traced in the assumed Cartesian foundations of Western 
scientific reasoning.12 The latter is responsible for a series of 
implicit principles and rules of present-day archaeological 
discourse, mostly the belief that scientific explanations are 
potentially absolute (i.e. to any given problem there can 
be only one solution, which is bound to overshadow any 
number of false solutions that may be proposed).13 The 
course of historical phenomena (the historical reality we are 
seeking to investigate), therefore, is subject to explanations 
based on causality(that is, a strict and linear understand-
ing of the cause-and-effect relation) and teleology(in other 
words, the belief in the overall design, directive principle, 
or finality in nature or human creations). As a result, tra-
ditional archaeology promotes essentialist interpretations 
(that is, explanations based on the belief that certain at-
titudes or emotions are ‘natural’ or biologically endowed 
to race or gender). The construction of such scholarly nar-
ratives, promoted via a self-referential, introverted, and 
deeply conservative academic system, ultimately functions 
as a legitimizing device within contemporary Western 
societies, which in turn supports and promotes  (through 
direct or indirect financing) this educational system in the 
first place.14 
Thus, based on a pseudo-Cartesian paradigm, archaeo-
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logical science has been confident that the past could be 
understood in linear fashion, through a causal model link-
ing the material remains to the culture that created them. 
Furthermore, it was understood that this model could be 
described and explained on the basis of the natural laws 
governing the universe (and historical time within it). This 
introverted self-sufficiency of modern scientific methodol-
ogy soon turned archaeology into a thoroughly traditional 
episteme, cut off from developments elsewhere, until as late 
as the eighties, when post-processualism came to the fore. 
In the meantime, the cause-and-effect reading of histori-
cal phenomena had already been shaken off, in the early 
decades of the twentieth century, when Newtonian physics 
came under review, thus undermining the age-old Western 
conviction regarding the linearity of historical time.
Natural and (art-)historical time: Newton to Beazley
From as early as the thirties, scientific progress, particu-
larly in physics, has had significant repercussions on the 
way we understand time – and accordingly the way we 
construct our relationship with the past. These break-
throughs, however, have had very little, if any, effect, 
on the methodology of disciplines such as history or ar-
chaeology, ostensibly themselves rooted in the paradigm 
imported from the natural sciences: that is, on the belief 
that time, and historical (or art historical) events within 
it, are subject to a natural law perfectly accessible to hu-
man intelligence.
The natural laws outlined by Isaac Newton in his mon-
umental PrincipiaMathematica in 1687, combined with 
his very own law of gravity, seemed to provide the neces-
sary tools in order to predict planetary movement. The 
Newtonian laws ended a long period of scientific inquiry 
initiated in the sixteenth century by Copernicus, whose 
work, however, was scarcely noticed by his contemporar-
ies and only became more widely accepted a good deal 
later.15 The Newtonian view of the universe was timeless, 
deterministic, and objective, as his laws seemed to work 
with no reference to the observer or the scientist: a state of 
things aspired to by nineteenth-century scholarship.
Based on Newtonian physics, the French scientist Mar-
quis Pierre-Simon de Laplace formulated the proposal, at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, that the universe 
functions in a mode of strict causality, based on simple but 
strict laws, which govern its eternal, linear development, 
as well as human behaviour within it. In turn, according 
to Laplace, it would be possible, provided we understood 
these laws, to explain human history once and for all, that 
is to interpret the past, as well as predict the future; in 
other words, to compose the Newtonian equation of his-
tory.16 Laplace imagined ‘an Intelligence who would know 
at a given instant of time all forces acting in nature’, an 
Intelligence ‘capable of subjecting all these data to math-
ematical analysis’.  This entity – now dubbed Laplace’s
demon – could then ‘derive a result that would embrace 
in one and the same formula the notion of the largest bod-
ies in the universe and of the lightest atoms. […] The past 
and the future would be present to its eyes’.17 Certainly, 
it was a phantasm, imaginary and demonic at the same 
time; though one created by a man’s belief in science and 
his very own power of intellect. According to this read-
ing, history was seen as a continuous, one-dimensional 
progression towards the triumph of reason. Historians 
were thus encouraged to think as scientists, accepting 
that under the same circumstances, the same data lead to 
the same results, therefore that history repeats itself. As 
historian Michael Shermer has put it, ‘physicists chased 
the dream, and historians chased the physicists’.18
In the meantime, classical archaeology had acquired a 
‘scientific’ method of its own, through the conscientious 
and systematic efforts of Johann Joachim Winckelmann 
(1717-1768). Winckelmann introduced to the study of 
classical art the device of stylistic analysis, both as a taxo-
nomic instrument, through which a working classifica-
tion of works of art might be achieved, as well as a key to 
the aesthetic appreciation, which was, according to him, 
vital to the historical assessment of any work. More sig-
nificantly, he produced a stylistic account of Greek art, 
composing a chronological narrative, and a linear one at 
that:  Winckelmann’s take on style (his description of pe-
riods, trends, and individual artistic personalities) set the 
pattern according to which classical culture is classified 
and studied to this day: as an evolutionary, progressive 
scheme, structured through autonomous ‘works’ (usually 
referred to as ‘masterpieces’), born of the genius of their 
respective ‘creators’ or ‘masters’. This tautology results 
from the way Winckelmann equates a culture with its 
aesthetics. The latter is analyzed and classified on the ba-
sis of its style, based on independent cultural units taken 
to express, through the genius of their maker, the ‘soul’ of 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:31:14 |
256 MOUSEIO BENAKI
D I M I T R I S  P L A N T Z O S
A  S I N G U L A R  A N T I Q U I T Y
the culture he (very rarely she) represents.19 This proved an 
ingenious, and fruitful, attempt to reconcile the timeless 
world view promoted by the exponents of the Enlighten-
ment with the modern grasp of real and historical time: 
through linearity, evolution and historicity. 
According to Winckelmann’s paradigm, art evolves 
towards an inevitable culmination, and then proceeds to 
an equally inevitable decline: in the case of Greek art, the 
moment of culmination was the art of Pheidias, whose 
style expressed the highest Greek ideal, what those sculp-
tors before him could not achieve yet, and those after him 
could not achieve anymore. The scholar is able to know 
this course of things and judge the extent to which each 
artist conforms to these rules, so as to achieve the com-
mon goal of perfection. The scholar is thus cast in the role 
of what Laplace was going to imagine as a superhuman, 
intelligent being, his demon, able to follow the develop-
ment of artistic phenomena, based on his/her prior knowl-
edge of their predestined course.
Winckelmann’s contribution was highly appreciated 
by his contemporaries – and his intellectual inheritance 
is strongly felt to the present day; his premature death was 
deeply mourned and his contribution to science promptly 
recognized: a copperplate engraving, for example, made 
soon after his tragic death, claims that ‘in the midst of 
Rome Winckelmann lit the flame of the rationalstudy of 
the works of Antiquity’ (my emphasis).20 Still, individual 
artists were given a rather secondary role in Winckel-
mann’s narrative: they are subordinate to the general laws 
of art and history, and are only implicitly admitted to in-
fluence the course of their art, through their understand-
ing and application of the style of their epoch. This was a 
fundamentally Romantic, anti-Enlightenment attitude, 
based on regurgitated Platonism (in Ion, for example, 
the artist is described as the instrument of a higher power 
inspiring his creations) and widespread beliefs on the sig-
nificance of the subconscious for the ways an individual 
artist, group, or nation express themselves. German na-
tionalism, fervently championed by the likes of Friedrich 
Schlegel, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and Johann Gottfried 
Herder, sought to base its belief in the superiority – his-
torical, cultural, and spiritual – of the Germanic Urvolk 
(the primal people) on a new understanding of cognition 
and consciousness. Artists, like all other individual ac-
tors – single men or entire peoples – are thus seen as only 
half-conscious agents of superhuman forces, destined to 
express, through their personal idiosyncrasies, what is dic-
tated to them by the powers that be. In total, a thesis that 
had a tremendous influence on German aesthetics and 
the way art is approached by many specialists or laymen 
to the present day.21  
Classical archaeology turned to the individual (ostensibly 
the genius of the artist, though grasped through the genius 
of the scholar) only in the nineteenth century, and then 
only after certain developments had taken place elsewhere. 
The need to establish the individual as a free, intellectual 
agent in history, not subject to – but instigator and creator 
of – shifts in culture and art, was deeply rooted in Western 
humanism, but materialized rather late in Western thought 
and academic practice. According to Thomas Kuhn, it was 
a by-product of Copernican astronomical theory, or rather 
its dissemination (depicting as it did celestial movement as 
the result of the planets’ individual careers in the infinite 
cosmos).22 For the French philosophers in the eighteenth 
century, history was the study of man’s actions and knowl-
edge, a science dedicated to great nations and great minds, 
kings and philosophers like themselves. This was the dawn 
of the age of the intellectuals in Western Europe, men of 
letters dedicated to thought, who were to act thereupon as 
the main shapers of the historical narrative, and were there-
fore entitled to reserve a principal role for themselves in it.23 
Artistic genius was soon to be recognized as the true driv-
ing force in art, following Kantian teachings, and scholars 
became determined to enforce a positivist model in their 
investigation of the lost agents of history.24 At the same 
time, the concept of the avant-garde, referring to political 
radicalism as well as art, emerged in the writings of intel-
lectuals such as Henri de Saint Simon in the 1820s, who 
cast the artist in a prominent role in the construction of 
the ideal state, promising a future golden age, a bourgeois 
heaven of prosperity.25 
Based on the rationalist paradigm, scientific language 
was treated as a neutral, objective means of describing re-
ality, and nineteenth-century philologists, historians and 
archaeologists strove to achieve exactly that: to clarify the 
past. An anthropocentric reading of the past thus devel-
oped, based on the study of creations (artefacts or historical 
events, works of art or literature, military campaigns and 
revolutions, inventions and ideas) and their creators.26 
Since those early days, the turn of events has been rapid 
indeed. Ostensibly rooted in rationalism, the new ap-
proach was emphatically empiricist, a development that 
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can be reasonably explained in the ideological milieu of 
nineteenth-century Germany. The emergence of Ger-
man Romanticism, in conjunction with current political 
events, had led to the gradual disaffection among Ger-
man intellectuals with the Enlightenment project. Art 
(or rather individual works of art) was seen as expressions 
of men or groups of men in a certain moment in history. 
German nationalism left its deep trace on aesthetics, as we 
saw above, as did the notion of the German people being 
related to the Greeks, albeit in a mystical, abstract way.27 
The investigation of cultural phenomena is thus turned 
into a quest for individual ‘works’, and the study of indi-
vidual ‘authors’ replaces that of their era – as it is apriori 
accepted that the master not only expresses, but also influ-
ences his time. In his effort to understand and classify an-
cient styles, Winckelmann had adopted the scheme applied 
to the study of Renaissance art, thus using the notions of 
‘author’ and ‘work’ as methodological devices, analytical 
instruments in the service of his method. This application 
was maintained and expanded in the nineteenth century, 
and consolidated in the twentieth century through a series 
of mainstream classical archaeological projects such as the 
study of the so-called ‘Roman copies’ and (or for the most 
part) the attempted classification of artworks according to 
their perceived creators, based on stylistic analysis and to a 
much lesser degree on iconographical or other criteria.
Academia was soon conscripted to support a return to 
the Greek past: in 1810, Wilhelm von Humboldt founded 
the University of Berlin, where emphasis was placed on 
classical philology and classical archaeology, with the es-
tablishment of the first German chair in the subject.28 For 
German archaeologists of the late nineteenth century, a 
work of art was the voice of an individual artist expressed 
through his style. Though never stating explicitly what 
style was, they seemed to adopt the empiricist practice 
promoted by contemporary philology or history of art.29 
In his monumental MeisterwerkedergriechischenPlastik, 
published in 1893 and revised in English in 1895, Adolf 
Furtwängler approached Greek art (specifically sculpture) 
as a ‘long course of stylistic development’,30 articulated in 
terms of individual works and their authors. He is the first 
archaeologist to use the term connoisseurship, which he 
actually projects back to antiquity (‘die Kenner im Alter-
tum’).31 His reading of art history is at the same time tele-
ological and anthropocentric, to the extent that it professes 
to establish a line of continuity through the development 
of art instigated by individual geniuses who could sense 
where that line was actually taking them. Furtwängler 
calls his method ‘scientific’ and feels accordingly justified 
in discarding the views of other scholars as ‘demonstrably 
false’.32 Methodically, he guides his connoisseur’s gaze to-
wards the seemingly insignificant anatomical details in a 
work of art (a finger here, an ear there) claiming to be able 
to insulate his methodological tools from the theoretical 
framework in which they are conceived and applied, in an 
attempt to support the ‘scientific’ character of his project.
These henceforth autonomous ‘works’ become, as it 
were, the bricks in a Lego-set with which to construct a 
cultural-historical narrative; their attribution to respec-
tive creative entities – ‘makers’, ‘authors’, ‘artists’, ‘masters’ 
– facilitates the structuring of information in chronologi-
cal and geographical terms (since men are by definition 
confined to specific times and places). By doing this, we 
invest our narratives with the integrity of personal author-
ity (that of the dead ‘author’, to be sure, as well as that of 
the very much alive ‘specialist’ – ourselves – at the same 
time), a gesture with ideological but also practical impli-
cations. It is, for example, indicative that from as early as 
the nineteenth century we have insisted on referring to 
random assemblages of artefacts, produced by collecting 
practices or the accidents of excavation – Alfred Gell’s 
‘distributed objects’  –, as bodies(‘corpora’): a term im-
plying organic integrity, charged with a particular ideo-
logical meaning, which encourages prospective students 
to confine themselves within preset boundaries, in order 
to achieve thoroughness and comprehensiveness.33
From as early as the Renaissance, but mostly since the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, those literary sources 
surviving since antiquity were seen as the solid foundation 
of classical studies, an authentic and authoritative, trans-
parent and irrefutable testimony on the ancient world, 
bound to be exemplified, supplemented even, but rarely 
challenged by the study of material remains. The artefact-
oriented study of the past led to the individualization of 
the ‘work’ as a bearer of first-hand cultural information, 
making it the subject of research rather than its tool. The 
emergence of philology in the nineteenth century as the 
champion of modern epistemology led to the recognition 
of linguistic significations as solid values, penetrable by 
a kind of positivist science. Ernest Renan, an orientalist 
philologist of the nineteenth century, who explored in his 
many writings the way philology and modern culture are 
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both interconnected and interdependent, claimed in 1848 
in a work entitled TheComingofScience that ‘the found-
ers of modern mind are philologists’. ‘What is modern 
mind?’  he asked himself. What if not ‘rationalism, criti-
cism, liberalism, [all of which] were founded on the same 
day as philology?’34 As a result, the scientific logoswas ob-
jectified, it was seen as an infallible tool with which to de-
scribe reality. The essentialist approach to the text turned 
it into the bearer of authentic meaning against which all 
other indices of human experience were to be tested. In 
the words of Michel Foucault, ‘the truth of discourse is 
caught up in the trap of philology’.35
In this sense, artefacts – works of art in particular 
(works of sculpture, painting and vase-painting, architec-
ture even) – are treated as texts, agents, that is, of textual 
information. In order to decode these texts, and harvest 
the embedded meanings, classical archaeologists need only 
read the language they were composed in, what we gener-
ally refer to as ‘style’. The quasi-Newtonian methodology 
constructed by the fathers of archaeological empiricism 
in the late nineteenth century and the early decades of 
the twentieth, combining factual observation with pre-
conceived notions about humanity and history, has been 
shown to have been founded on ‘a naïve, pre-Kantian 
metaphysics that promised the discovery of objective 
truths through the deployment of formalized and stand-
ard methodologies’.36
This empirical approach to Greek art (based on the 
mystic notions of thehandoftheartist and theeyeofthe
scholar) was significantly developed by Sir John Beazley 
(1885-1970), Professor in Classical Archaeology and Art 
at the University of Oxford between 1925 and 1954.37 
His papers on individual Athenian vase painters (and 
to a lesser extent potters) set a magisterial precedent in 
Greek archaeology studies, took full advantage of con-
noisseurship as a method to identify ancient styles and 
their creators, and – one could claim – seemed to take 
this approach to its limits. (Beazley’s followers certainly 
did.) As John Boardman has put it, often enough ‘the 
study is an end in itself ’.38 A hard-core essentialist, Beaz-
ley famously insisted that ‘the name of the painter […] is 
of little importance; what interests us is himself and his 
style’, 39 a statement that would make Lyotard shriek, had 
he been interested in Greek vases. His aim was to identify 
each artist’s individual traits, affectations and idiosyncra-
sies, which were thought to construct his personal style, a 
discovery then used to attribute anonymous works to their 
discernible masters.
It should be noted here, of course, that since those early 
days classical archaeology has indeed evolved in many re-
spects – many branches of the discipline have benefited 
from developments elsewhere, such as the fields of social 
anthropology or geography, and they do not seem at all 
influenced by what I am describing here. Nevertheless, 
the art historical paradigm is far from obsolete in classical 
archaeology at large. As a matter of fact its employment 
seems to be being expanded rather than curtailed. In the 
past twenty years or so, its use has been exported from the 
fields traditionally associated with it (such as the study of 
classical sculpture and painting for example) to the rather 
unsuspecting fields of prehistory – in addition to the ‘art 
historical’ field of Cycladic sculpture, for example, con-
noisseurial arguments have been imported into the sub-
fields of Mycenaean and Minoan pottery and seal-cutting 
– or the archaeologies on the periphery of the old classical 
canon, such as the study of Roman Britain or Spain, not 
to mention numismatics or epigraphy. When such reason-
ing is incorporated into the reading of entire sites, then it 
becomes apparent that the linear art historical narrative of 
Greek art is not only alive and well, but positively thriving, 
and that ‘style’ is still for us, classical archaeologists, pretty 
much a textual entity, open to our critical discourse (or 
rather transparent to our educated eye).
What is style? In a discipline which takes pride in its 
aversion to theory, it is not surprising that such defini-
tions are not forthcoming. ‘Style’ remains a vague word 
put to a number of disparate uses;40 for many, especially 
art historians, treatment of style is voluntarily subject to 
aesthetic appreciation (whereas for others, cultural an-
thropologists mostly, it is forcibly dissociated from such 
projects). Judging nonetheless by the way in which sty-
listic observations are usually incorporated into the com-
position of art historical narratives, we may conclude that 
style is perceived as a strictly personal mode of expression, 
declared through a system of artistic devices, idiosyncra-
sies and preferences.41 
In a ground-breaking, though subsequently rather over-
looked, paper published in 1922, Beazley – at a time when 
he was embarking on his life-long endeavour of identify-
ing and studying the ‘hands’ of Athenian vase painters of 
the Archaic and Classical period – formulated the Laws 
of artistic creation.42
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He defined, first, a given work of art (‘a substantive 
work’ ) as the sum of what he referred to as execution, 
renderings (or actually the system thereof), and the design 
overall: 
Wo = E + R + D. 
In the same vein, a copy was defined as the ratio of execu
tionto the sum of renderings plus design : 
Finally, a variation on a given work, what he referred to as 
a translation, was described by Beazley as the ratio of the 
sum of executionplus renderingsto the overall design :
These LawsofArtisticCreationaccording to Beazley 
where he obviously tries to invest his axiomatic statements 
with the authority of a natural law – expressed in algebraic 
form nonetheless – are clearly influenced by both the let-
ter and the spirit of Newtonian physics. Furthermore, his 
Laws are fundamentally historical, as they strive to endow 
a series of empirical observations and connoisseur-like 
subtleties with the strength of a scientific law – no matter 
how experimental – regarding the artistic creative proc-
ess. Beazley’s equations are historical, for one because they 
emphasize systemic action within his chosen field of study; 
more to the point, his formulas are story-like as they at-
tempt to organize artistic creation, as well as its reception 
and experience in time, present in these equations in an 
implicit, though extremely poignant way: the notion of 
creative process in itself presupposes the notion of time, 
and its every rerun repeats the equation, therefore creates 
further time.
As in Newtonian laws, time is spoken of in a quiet man-
ner; its presence is implicit, but strongly felt.43 In the Sec-
ond Law of Motion, for example (also known as the Basic 
Law of Mechanics), Force equals mass times acceleration:
F = ma. Each such equation is a metaphorical expression 
(composed by a physicist) of a narrative that is explicity 
historical: here, time is implied by what the physicists 
call acceleration, defining the next step in the story, thus 
bringing us closer to history. In Beazley’s laws, time hides 
under such terms as rendering,design,execution, all terms 
suggesting action and its repetition. The archaeologist is 
thus called to implement this metaphor, by repeating 
(notionally) the individual stages in the artistic process. 
Each new equation – fed with the result of the previous 
one – brings us closer to history, assessing human experi-
ence through time. This is an engineering model, known 
in mathematics as a differential equation: a differential 
equation involves the rates of change of continuously 
changing quantities modelled by functions; it is employed 
whenever a rate of change (the derivative) is known but 
the process originating it is not. This is a very old kind of 
mathematical reasoning, developed in parallel by Newton 
and Leibniz in the last decades of the seventeenth century 
and fiercely claimed by their followers on behalf of their 
respective champions. In historical terms, the stories nar-
rated by such equations are inexplicit in their meanings: 
it is the analyst that makes them explicit, that is the histo-
rian – or in our case the art historian/connoisseur.44
This interpretation of art historical reasoning is, I be-
lieve, of crucial importance for the assessment of stylistic 
analysis as an archaeological discourse: although based on 
science, and the way mathematics and physics in particu-
lar viewed the development of such phenomena since the 
days of Newton, it is now known that such systems are not 
subject to linear development, therefore their evolution 
may not be studied – let alone predicted – based on linear 
reasoning.
According to the principles of the art historical meth-
odology, keenly applied by classical archaeology since as 
early as the 1870s, style is understood as an interactive sys-
tem of ideological and modular variables, what in physics 
is called a dynamicalsystem. The causal relations within 
such a system evolve through time and may not be stud-
ied, therefore, based on a static model merely describing 
their state at a given moment in this process. Dynamical 
systems and their structure (which is subject to a new sort 
of nonlinear causality) are now studied by the widely 
known ‘chaos theory’: though not technically a theory 
as such, but rather a set of considerations on the non-lin-
earity of dynamical systems, ‘chaos’ is a methodological 
device, a paradigm through which physicists are trying to 
comprehend randomness and predictability in nature.
Since the sixties, successive observations and discoveries 
have led scientists to the conclusion that dynamical systems, 
hitherto thought to be subject to the laws of linear causal-
ity, in fact evolved in a much more complicated manner, 
prone to randomness and non-predictability.45 Chaos has 
helped to revise causality, since: systemic phenomena ap-
pear to be sensitively dependent on initial conditions; cause 
and effect may not be directly proportional – rather subtle 
Wc =     E   
            R+D
Wt = E+R 
              D
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diversions (or ‘errors’) in initial or intervening conditions 
create grossly disproportionate results; natural phenomena 
are not deterministic (nor linear) and therefore may not 
be treated as predictable.46 Incidentally (though crucially) 
this is an inherent feature of dynamical systems and not an 
unforeseen and unfortunate error in their build.47
Furtwängler, Beazley, and many an art historian to the 
present day, envisage time as a serene field of action, not 
perturbed by the anxieties of irregularity or the frustra-
tions of ‘little’ history. Bernard Berenson (1865-1956),48 
for example, a cosmopolitan art critic and connoisseur 
whose knowledge of Renaissance painting gained him 
high acclaim in the inter-war period while his (dubious) 
liaisons with collectors and art-dealers gave him a rather 
bad reputation, pronounced in his AestheticsandHistory 
(published in 1950), that ‘history narrates the ordered 
succession of significant events that have contributed to 
making us what we are to-day’.49 The essay, an authorita-
tive attempt to offer its author’s views on art and history, 
albeit through the display of such a cavalier attitude as to 
make the reader wonder whether the famous connoisseur 
could muster any real grasp of either, makes a fundamental 
distinction between a Rankean history of irrefutable facts 
and an art history of values, and timeless ones at that: ‘art 
history […] has to do with masterpieces still with us, still 
appealing, as living entities, as manifestly active energies’.50 
Overall, Berenson states that ‘art history […] is apt to pay 
too much attention to the “why” and not enough to the 
“how”’,51 thus clearly undervaluing his discipline’s histori-
cal considerations in favour of its aesthetic ones. Though 
extreme, Berenson’s example serves as a good reminder of 
the uses, ideological as well as political, that linear narrative 
was put to by twentieth-century art historians.
It is this timeless, a-historical reading of time that is the 
most problematic issue in such approaches. By the early 
twentieth century, physics had departed from Newtonian 
determinism, thus depriving positivists of their scientific 
pretence: based on the uncertainty principle, thermo-
dynamics, and the laws of quantum mechanics, there 
emerges a model for our universe much more unstable, 
uncertain and complicated than Newton ever imagined. 
According to non-classical physics, cosmic matter is in 
a state of disorder rather than calm, and time is relative, 
quantifiable, and finite.52 
Time is thus understood as a consequence of entropy 
(i.e.: irreversible loss of energy), more a symptom of man’s 
coming to terms with cosmic motion than an entity in 
itself.53 In the second half of the twentieth century, some 
sociologists and philosophers were thinking along the 
same lines: Norbert Elias, for example, suggested in his 
essay ÜberdieZeit – written in 1970 but published only 
in 198454 – that time is a social construct, devised by physi-
cists in order to describe cosmic motion. Although Elias 
in his essay steered clear of physics – save for a few general 
mentions of Einstein – he identified the scientific questions 
regarding time from his own point of view: if non-classical 
physics is right on entropy and time, then human life itself, 
including the human conscience, is a consequence of the 
theory under scrutiny, therefore any promise of an ‘objec-
tive’ study of time (including history) is utopian.
Rather than suggesting a viable alternative to the study 
of human societies, even though the temptation of using 
physics as an analogy to history is indeed great, both with 
the classical/Newtonian and the non-classical branches 
of the discipline, the laws of physics are thus found to be 
human constructs, not god-given truths. Subject to the 
potentialities and limitations of human intellect, these 
formulations are attempts to describe – and therefore in-
terpret – natural phenomena that exist beyond its control. 
Intriguingly, it has been argued that non-linear physics 
was widely accepted by the academic and intellectual es-
tablishment when it was, namely in the sixties, because 
until then the ‘mechanistic view of the world served as a 
legitimating ideology for the project of dominating na-
ture’,  and was therefore promoted by both the academia 
and ‘extrascientific parts of society’.55 In a similar vein, it 
has been argued that chaos theory was a product of post-
modern culture (and deconstructive literary theory) rather 
than the other way round.56  
Contrary to the determinism of a Newtonian universe, 
the quantum-mechanic paradigm allows for non-peri-
odical movement, thus rendering causal mechanisms 
extremely complicated.57 Randomness eliminates predict-
ability, in history as much as in physics. A strictly deter-
ministic model presupposes that replication of the process 
replicates the result. The lack of linearity and periodicity 
within a dynamical system, of those two notional qualities, 
that is, that guaranteed its causal structure and predictable 
nature, leads to the conclusion that phenomena may not 
be repeated evenintheory.58 Beazley thought that feeding 
his observations into his equations produced linear truth; 
now we know that feeding these data into the same equa-
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tions over and over again produces chaos. Our inability to 
repeat, even in laboratory conditions, natural phenomena, 
cancels out our favourite historical or art historical law: 
analogy. Analogies based on comparisons are used to clas-
sify events or artefacts, in an effort to extract metaphors – 
that is, stories. Each such analogy takes the replicability of 
dynamical phenomena for granted. Quantum mechanics 
renders analogies redundant, however: perceived similari-
ties or symmetries are there because they are perceived in 
the first place and, if tested, analogies may prove to count 
for little more than elaborate tautologies.59
Most general laws employed by Greek art historians to-
day are based on a now obsolete mathematical model of 
static causality, leaving non-linearity, non-predictability, 
uncertainty and chaotic motion60 unaccounted for. Hu-
man societies and their multifarious activities such as art 
are now perceived as ‘immensely complex systems’, dy
namicalsystemsin a mathematical sense, where predict-
ability is not an inherent quality.61 The endless number of 
possibilities and potential bifurcations in the development 
of even the simplest phenomena disables any all-embrac-
ing law that may be proposed. To put it in other words, the 
behaviour of a dynamical system could be explained by a 
general law, providedwehadexactknowledgeofinitial
conditions. It is a kind of trade-off, as historian George 
Reisch has called it, whereby: ‘provided the laws which 
govern a chaotic system are known, the greater the tempo-
ral distance between initial (and intervening) conditions 
on the one hand and the event to be explained on the oth-
er, the greater the accuracy with which those conditions 
must be known’. The risk is, I believe, pretty obvious: 
lacking knowledge of initial conditions may take us way 
off course, to analogies that can only prove themselves.
As was observed by physicist Richard Feynman, half 
a century of research in quantum electrodynamics has 
shown that theory must be able to predict the errors in-
herent in the experiment.62 In other words, analogies, 
similarities, symmetries and so on cannot function even 
within a theoretical art historical model. At this moment, 
though we are able to describe howdynamical systems 
work, we cannot yet explain whythey function that way. 
The Greek art narrative is based on a series of processes 
involving excavated and non-excavated artefacts (chro-
nology, stylistic classification, ethnic attribution and tax-
onomy, attribution to workshops or masters), all subject 
to a strictly positivist-empiricist paradigm. This model of 
thinking presupposes a one-dimensional, timeless history, 
predetermined and concluded, based on the ceaseless and 
invariable repetition of historical phenomena. The at-
tribution of specific works to known or devised artistic 
personalities is based on the forging of such a paradigm of 
linear development, a hypothetical mathematical model 
based on a one-dimensional cause-and-effect relation-
ship. This model presupposes the continuous repetition 
of certain stages in the creative process (as new ‘works’ are 
mastered by the supposed ‘author’), with no allowance 
for non-linear factors. The review of the linear-causality 
principle shakes the foundations of connoisseurship: very 
simply, whereas we may be able to explain why Painter A 
paints in Style X, we cannot prove that all works display-
ing Style X – and only those – have been produced by 
Painter A; and this, because we can no more argue that 
the same initial conditions (even in the event they were 
known to us) lead to the same results.
Connoisseurship, acting as one of the strongest pillars 
of a linear narrative for Greek art, derives its academic 
credentials from the individualism cultivated in Western 
thinking since the Renaissance, the essentialist approach 
to culture promoted by the Enlightenment, the ideologies 
championed by Romantic nationalism, and the methodol-
ogy of the natural sciences in the nineteenth century. As 
was observed as early as 1963 by art historian Edgar Wind, 
‘it has repeatedly happened in the history of scholarship 
that a technique outlasted the philosophy that prompted 
it’.63 The reasons for this are rarely due to the validity of 
the techniques themselves; rather, their successful employ-
ment has created new academic realities, new intellectual 
modalities that establish themselves as the uncontested 
orthodoxy. 
Rather than advocating, therefore, the replacement of an 
obsolete epistemological tool with another, by favouring a 
new kind of analogy with the natural sciences, this paper 
calls for a historical assessment of the theories we subscribe 
to, and investigation of our collective and personal mo-
tives, as a means of understanding our discipline before 
attempting, perhaps, to change it.
The dupes and the agents
It has been shown that Beazley owed his method to Italian 
connoisseur Giovanni Morelli (1816-1891),64 whose influ-
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ence has also been traced in the work of Furtwängler.65 
The Morellian approach reversed hitherto traditional 
aesthetics by ignoring the obvious characteristics of a 
painting (composition, colours, expression, iconography) 
in favour of the subtle declarations of the artistic personal-
ity, such as renderings of anatomy, stylistic peculiarities, 
unconscious choices, or even mistakes. Though not all 
succumbed to this new cult of the individual,66 it seems 
that classical archaeology took a definite turn towards 
this whimsical mixture of idealist aesthetics with posi-
tivist method after Beazley, ignoring voices from other 
quarters.67 Beazley’s Athens is constructed as an eclectic 
topos, with ‘masters’, ‘workshops’, ‘circles’ and ‘schools’, a 
Greek polis through Renaissance eyes, where the ‘Kleo-
phrades Painter may be said to play a kind of Florentine 
to the Berlin Painter’s Sienese’.68 It may be argued (and 
it has been), that this is an Oxbridge Athens, suitable for 
well-read academics such as Beazley, who sought, follow-
ing the likes of Russell and Wittgenstein, to investigate 
the contribution of significant individuals to history.69 
The persistence of connoisseurship in the second half of 
the twentieth century, aided by a general reluctance of 
historians of ancient art and classical archaeologists to en-
gage in theoretical discussion, threatened to monopolize 
classical-archaeological studies; more to the point, it was 
exported, as we saw, to less ‘art historical’ subjects, such as 
prehistoric archaeology which was subjected to the same 
art historical approach.70
Critique has been levelled against Beazley’s method on 
many different grounds, empiricist to theorist.71 By lim-
iting ourselves to the study of individual styles, the gen-
eral consensus of these critics seems to be, we restrict our 
research to the creative process and its mechanisms. We 
thus ignore vast areas of cultural integration, such as so-
cial reception and reading, use and misuse, dissemination 
and survival and so on, all excluding the artist’s (or, more 
to the point, the craftsman’s) involvement. Rather than 
being ‘a system so definite, coherent, distinctive and in 
some respects so wilful, [that] is most easily intelligible as 
a personal system’,72 style is to a great extent a social con-
struct, a collective appreciation generated in the beholders’ 
eyes, a dynamic balance that would, perhaps, surprise its 
‘maker’.73 Only by departing from aesthetics – the ‘bur-
den of beauty’  laid on most archaeological artefacts by 
Greek art enthusiasts – can we possibly understand the 
social significance of these objects, and of the events that 
produced them, that is, their social agency (whereby a so-
cially significant quality of action – agency – becomes the 
focus of our study rather than the minutiae of actionitself, 
the supposed ‘facts’ historians make a habit of chasing).74 
If all we know about these shadowy figures comes from 
the works they seem to have produced, and which come 
to us one way or another, as excavators and looters would 
have it, why is it that we need to establish them as artistic 
personalities from a distant past? The answer of course 
lies in taxonomy, the perennial objective of modern sci-
ence, and an inherent affectation of classical archaeology. 
Rather than being acknowledged, however, as an external 
descriptive tool applied to the material being studied by 
the taxonomist/connoisseur, style is promoted as an es
sential part of an artist’s personality, thus masking the 
methodology followed by the ‘specialist’, and its ideologi-
cal implications.  
Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholars such 
as Furtwängler and Beazley vehemently refused to discuss 
theory. Insisting, as they did, that their strictly positivist 
approach could not be contaminated by subjective biases 
(such as personal thoughts or ideas), they claimed to see 
no reason to introduce theory in a seemingly a-theoretical 
process. This ‘new way of making history’75 was more sat-
isfactory, as it connected discourse to the eye and elevated 
commonplace observations to the status of scholarship, 
thus securing the functional efficiency of the scholarly 
approach, as well as state guardianship over heritage and 
its remains.76 The new stereotypes it created (among them 
‘the great artist’ and ‘the wise scholar’ both still in cur-
rency) were instrumental for the new narrative of history 
and art, Greek, European or other, a history fit for mass 
consumption in a century that was going to celebrate ex-
actly that: the will of the masses to consume. And quite 
appropriately, albeit rather ironically, it was the culturein
dustry rather than the artistic avant-garde, so wholeheart-
edly celebrated by this particular strain of a relentlessly 
bourgeois episteme, that transformed everyday life in the 
twentieth century, and finally won the day.77
As historian Carlo Ginzburg has shown,78 connoisseur-
ship utilizes a new epistemological paradigm that emerged 
in European episteme in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, and affected primarily the field of the Humani-
ties.79 Based on the speculative assessment of a mass of ob-
scure, seemingly trivial or unrelated material, the rational 
individual retraces the past, thus turning the clues in his 
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hands into a bodyofevidence. This new way of academic 
reasoning, called abduction, in effect invalidated Carte-
sian logic and Francis Bacon’s inductive paradigm which 
had stood as the basis of Western philosophy and science 
since the seventeenth century.80 Reason was gradually, 
though surreptitiously, replaced by empiricist common 
sense (which for many twentieth-century art historians 
equals commonplace). This sentimental quest for the lost 
individual creator inspired a century of (mostly classical) 
archaeology where the symptom replaced the phenom-
enon ostensibly under study. 
Abductive reasoning is based on prior acceptance of 
the linearity of cultural phenomena, as well as the power 
of human intellect to produce transparent (that is ‘objec-
tive’) and secure conclusions based on reason, judgement, 
and what we often call ‘the expert eye’. This is in fact an 
exhaustive game of mirrors, whereby the repeated displays 
of intellectual skill finally render the paradigm invisible.81 
Through quasi-scientific discourse – barely disguising 
purely metaphysical manifestations – the scholar appears 
as the agent of a seemingly transparent logos, one that 
qualifies itself.82 Our analogies attempt a representation 
of the phenomenon in mathematical terms: the scientific 
premise seeks to hide the fact that what is attempted is a 
representation in the first place, in other words ‘metaphysi-
cal speculation disguised as an empirical science’.83 This is 
an attitude inherent in modernity, within which it presents 
itself in the field of science as well as in politics.84
Ginzburg is right to associate this phenomenon with 
political developments in Western Europe, where the 
central state wished to control, supervise and discipline 
its subjects.85 As has been argued by Michel Foucault,86 an 
all-seeing (panoptic) modality of power was essential to 
the bourgeoisie’s attempts to claim a dominant political 
and social role for itself in the course of the eighteenth cen-
tury, an endeavour masked by the Enlightenment project 
and the liberties it introduced.87 Academic reasoning was 
instrumental in this, and the philosophesof the eighteenth 
century, followed by their successors, the Professorenof 
the nineteenth, worked hard to create a bourgeois epis-
teme which was to claim its rightful place in the century 
that followed. This was a new, quiet and discreet, humbly 
a-theoretical and ardently empiricist type of ‘in-house dis-
course’,88 accessible to all, since it aimed to please all, by 
producing a reassuring, innocuous and legitimate narra-
tive for art and history. Difference was under strict surveil-
lance and dissidence duly suppressed. As argued by histo-
rian Hayden White in 1987, linear historiography, which 
played a dominant role in the development of modern 
humanities, is ‘the representational practice best suited to 
the production of the “law-abiding” citizen’. Linear nar-
ratives, he claimed, are especially well suited ‘to the pro-
duction of notions of continuity, wholeness, closure, and 
individuality that every “civilized” society wishes to see 
itself as incarnating, against the chaos of a merely “natu-
ral” way of life.’  Just as modernity praised reason, regu-
larity and symmetry, methodological consistency – ‘the 
like treatment of like cases’  – was prized as the guarantor 
of scientific coherence and stability, but in a bureaucratic 
sense. The desire to establish a rational ethos overall, in its 
Weberian sense, is evident in archaeology’s claims to ‘sci-
entific objectivity’: coherence, consistency, and effective-
ness have long been identified as the ambitions of modern 
episteme, in an effort to establish long, linear, and reassur-
ing historical narratives that ‘make sense’. 89
Modern art criticism, starting some time in the nine-
teenth century, proceeded to establish ‘the author’ as a 
figure central to our understanding of art and culture, 
contemporary or ancient. The process of what has been 
called ‘ the creation of the creator’90 has been well studied 
by many since the seventies, even though archaeologists 
and historians of ancient art seem reluctant to consider 
this line of thought. The quest for the Greek Master con-
tinued quite late into the twentieth century, even after 
the very concept of ‘the author’ in literature and art had 
been seriously challenged. In 1968, Roland Barthes had 
spoken of thedeathoftheauthor, claiming that ‘ the au-
thor is a modern figure, a product of our society insofar 
as, emerging from the Middle Ages with English empiri-
cism, French rationalism and the personal faith of the Ref-
ormation, it discovered the prestige of the individual’.91 
This concept was further explored by Foucault at about 
the same time.92 He traced stylistic studies of individual 
authors in the philologists of Late Antiquity,93 arguing 
that this ancient model influenced the modern field of 
the Humanities. As a result, the modern authoris a taxo-
nomic device, a classification tool used to harness the text 
rather than elucidate it. As an ontology, a ‘human person’, 
the author is used to eliminate inconsistency, to safeguard 
continuity and to express ideas said to be his own. In 
other words, he is the guarantor of linear and predictable 
history, an agent for causality in scholarly discourse, and 
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a witness to the success of the modern epistemological 
paradigm. The more we speak of the genius of these art-
ists, the more we burden them with modern concepts and 
ideas which we wish to impose on their time.
This brief analysis of twentieth-century scholarly men-
talities explains, I believe, the enthusiastic interest archae-
ologists and art historians have shown for the lost artist. 
Certainly, ‘pigeon-holing is an exercise in power’.94 The 
scholar-detective that emerged as the stereotypical archae-
ologist of the twentieth century, shrewdly – albeit some-
what callously – assessing the disparate evidence in order 
to capture the elusive artist,95 owes as much to nineteenth-
century crime fiction (Ginzburg talks of Sherlock Holm-
es) as to police practices of surveillance in modern states.96 
Capturing criminal elements (certainly in literature or on 
the T.V.), decoding the symptoms and reading the signs is 
a fascinating business indeed. Fredric Jameson has recog-
nized in modern scholarship a ‘self-referential, if not per-
formative’ trope, generating a quasi-libidinal intellectual 
excitement, ‘a promise within a present of time [of] a way 
of possessing the future’.97 The excitement of conversing 
with the creators of the past – from Pheidias and Perikles 
to Alexander and Augustus – is a good incentive for the 
scholar in modern episteme, and is not likely to subside 
anytime soon. We are proud of the things we know and 
of the things we write, and when – including this paper 
– we refer to those before us as great authorities – from 
Furtwängler and Beazley to Barthes and Foucault – we 
are quietly hoping that someone will do the same for us in 
the not-so-distant future. History thus regains its cause-
and-effect succession, and reclaims its linear perspective. 
Though the philosophies that generated individualism 
and abductive reasoning in Western scholarship are now 
long obsolete, connoisseurship and similar empirical tools 
show remarkable signs of persistence. Unbeknown to us 
and our students, nineteenth-century science has never 
left us: ‘and here we are again, far more than we know, 
both the dupes and the agents of a scientific age’.98
Having said that, I should admit that often enough, our 
empiricist dispositions get the better of our good inten-
tions. Human experience is much closer to a Newtonian 
universe rather than a quantum-mechanic one. Hence, 
our feeling at ease with a theory that seems to coincide 
with our day-to-day experience. Human limitations, bio-
logical as well as intellectual, are binding for human sci-
ence, and human intellect at large: the sense of time and 
space, size or distance are subject to the measure of hu-
manity and the way we can, based on our natural endow-
ment, comprehend the world far or near. This is all part 
of a universal human strategy – the anthropicstrategy or 
principle as it has been dubbed by scientists – in order to 
tame the notion of life being the result of randomness (in 
other words, ‘things ought to be the way we see them, for 
otherwise we would not be able to see them!’).99 Histori-
ans attempt a reversal of the causal development (holding 
onto the effect and searching for the cause). As a result, 
they create the illusion of historical necessity and linear 
development, leading unfailingly to a predestined future. 
This is corroborated by day-to-day human experience, 
where relativity manifests itself in an exceedingly subtle, 
therefore imperceptible manner. Archaeologists are thus 
trapped into an empiricist discourse, in a futile effort to 
explore the motionless body of an irrevocable past.
Post-script: Time and the Nation
Like anthropology, archaeology too can be described as 
an ‘allochronic’ discourse, a study of man-made culture 
produced elsewhere, at another time.100 Archaeology, 
like its sister-disciplines of ethnography, ethnology, and 
anthropology itself, was given its epistemological shape 
at a time when Western academia deployed the study of 
the past as an intellectual justification for colonialism 
and imperialism.101 Classical archaeology in particular, 
was used to forge the cultural links of the West with its 
lost Graeco-Roman childhood, the rediscovery of which 
made the state of modern Greece all the more deplor-
able.102 Constructing the Other as its object of study was 
vital for the colonialist project, as it guaranteed – through 
the forged distance in time and place – that the Other 
would remain silent, or in what has been described as a 
‘state of ab-sense’.103 Archaeology, detached and objective, 
was called in to perform the crucial role of producing the 
‘facts’ needed in order to represent the past as an artefact 
available to ‘scientific’ scrutiny.
Connoisseurship is seemingly split in that respect, as 
it is dealing with historical phenomena of the past, thus 
concluded ones, while on the other hand its subject is art, 
which is by definition accepted by the connoisseur as 
‘eternal’: a masterpiece of classical sculpture is recognized 
as such equally in fifth-century Athens and eighteenth-
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:31:14 |
3rd SU PPL E M EN T, AT H ENS 20 08 265
Time and the Antique: linear causality and the Greek art narrative
A R C H A E O L O G Y  A N D  H E L L E N I C  I D E N T I T Y  I N  T W E N T I E T H - C E N T U R Y  G R E E C E
century Rome, and the style of an Athenian master vase-
painter can gain him as much recognition in Renaissance 
Florence as in the Archaic Kerameikos (not to mention 
twentieth-century Oxford or New York). Connoisseur-
ship thus transcends the temporal divide: the student and 
his or her object of study are perceived to co-exist in time, 
and a Newtonian – linear and absolute – time at that.
By means of this scientific premise, the Greek art nar-
rative was constructed  as an objective discourse, external 
to the observer, open to rational scrutiny, even though 
in practice it re-enforced the notion of the scholar as a 
mystic, imparting morsels of knowledge gained through 
tedious taxonomy, classification and decipherment. As an 
authoritative assessment of the past, this way of teaching 
history guarantees firm control over the present experi-
ence, reinforcing what Derrida called ‘a metaphysics of 
presence’.104 Positivist methodologies, such as attribution 
studies as outlined above, become effective by virtue of 
their pedantry; furthermore, they promote the reassuring 
conviction that the Other is accessible and predictable, at 
one’s scholarly disposal. These methods have now been 
rightly exposed as ‘regressive intellectually, and quite reac-
tionary politically’.105 ‘Regressive’, as they adopted, in order 
to achieve a quasi-scientific status, a Newtonian view of 
time only when, at the end of the nineteenth century, the 
limitations of Newtonian physics were becoming obvious 
to scientists. And ‘reactionary’, as their enthusiasts failed 
to observe (or pretended not to) that the results of their 
seemingly detached and transparent methodology were, 
historically and politically, anything but. Rationality has 
long been identified as a key intellectual issue raised by 
orientalist discourse in an attempt to define, isolate, study, 
and therefore control the Orient (including the ‘classical 
lands’) on behalf of Western episteme.106 It is also a useful 
discriminatory tool between ‘them’ and ‘us’, the subjects 
of study and its agents, especially when the former refuse 
to keep quiet. It is certainly no coincidence that disciplines 
like archaeology or folklore, promising to deliver ‘absolute, 
context-free knowledge’ emerged in the area of Greek stud-
ies simultaneously with empiricism;107 nor that this line of 
academic reasoning was adopted with enthusiasm by stu-
dents of ancient Greek art in Greece itself.
By colonizing Greek antiquity, from the days of Phil-
hellenism on, Western enthusiasts seemed to be paying 
a grand compliment to modern Greeks who, as has been 
observed by Michael Herzfeld, relished the superlative 
rhetoric while failing (strategically ?) to subscribe to its un-
derlying ideology.108 Archaeology has been one of the key 
projects through which to imagine the nation, in Ander-
son’s now classic terminology, both as an entity external 
to the observer (i.e. in the case of Greece, from the point 
of view of the tutelary Powers at the end of the War of In-
dependence) and as a collective experience from within.109 
In the case of Greece, the latter would refer to the local 
Western-educated elites, which usurped the role of the ab-
sent colonialists, thus becoming the country’s national(ist) 
bourgeoisie in their place, rendering national ideology and 
rhetoric in a state of ‘self-colonization’.110 Critiquing Said’s 
(and Anderson’s) rather monolithic view that non-West-
ern imagination was entirely and aprioricolonized by the 
West, Lynn Meskell was right to suggest that local elites 
and other powers emanating from withinthe nation-state 
produced a multitude of centrifugal narratives, apparently 
not controlled by the colonialist centres.111 
Classical antiquity, emblematized in the forms of Greek 
art – through the process of ‘logoization’ of culture com-
mon in nationalist projects112 – was treated as valuable 
national capital by the Greek elite, and at the same time 
became a powerful weapon to be deployed in the cause of 
Greek nationalism.113 In an effort to deny the rejection of 
modern Greece implicit in the promotion of classical her-
itage by the West, Greeks promoted the very same heritage 
in order to state, and quite explicitly so, that Greek moder-
nity co-exists with Greek antiquity, both as a continuation 
of and a supplement to it. Locally identified as ‘national’, 
and internationally often misjudged as atavistic, projects 
such as archaeology are meant to confirm identities and 
reinforce national ties, inscribing the nation’s locality onto 
the bodies of its subjects, a process that has been described 
as ‘the production of natives’.114 
Archaeology in Greece was given the task of producing 
the national subjects as well as the contextual framework 
for their expression, while at the same time serving the 
established culture and its rhetoric. The linear Greek art 
narrative, in particular, still promoted by most authorities 
in the country, inside and outside the university, has been 
tailored to fit the nation’s needs: it is predictable enough 
in its readings to be accessible, but sufficiently cryptic in 
its manifestations to require ‘the specialist’; it offers the 
necessary visual stimuli – based, as it is, on both tangible 
evidence and the aesthetic value invested in it – so as to 
satisfy the nation’s ‘longing for form’;115 it is teleological 
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and deterministic so as to enforce the nation’s belief in its 
singular merit and higher destiny; finally, it has been ex-
pertly designed – by some of classical archaeology’s found-
ing fathers – as a legitimizing tool and control mechanism 
promoting cultural chauvinism and social exclusion. At a 
time of new border conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere, 
near or far, Greece reluctantly plays host to hundreds of 
thousands of refugees, asylum seekers, and illegal immi-
grants whose multicultural presence poses a severe threat 
for what Greeks universally perceive as their homogene-
ous community. We are bound therefore to witness a reaf-
firmation of Hellenicity, crucially involving classical and 
pre-classical antiquity, no longer (or not so much) as am-
munition against the cultural aggressiveness of the West, 
but as a discriminatory apparatus at home, safeguarding 
‘national purity’. The promotion of continuity in Greek 
culture, however, suggested by a linear art historical nar-
rative for Greek art, classical or post-classical, can do very 
little to soothe the pains and frustrations of a society in 
a perpetual identity crisis, thus coming to terms with the 
end of modernity.
Dimitris Plantzos
dkplantzos@yahoo.gr
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